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Abstract - Deep neural networks are learning models having 
achieved state of the art performance in many fields like 
prediction, computer vision, language processing and so on. 
However, it has been shown that certain inputs exist which 
would not trick a human normally, but may mislead the model 
completely. These inputs are known as adversarial inputs. 
These inputs pose a high security threat when such models are 
used in real world applications. In this work, we have analyzed 
the resistance of three different classes of fully connected dense 
networks against the rarely tested non-gradient based 
adversarial attacks. These classes are created by manipulating 
the input and output layers. We have proven empirically that 
owing to certain characteristics of the network, they provide a 
high robustness against these attacks, and can be used in fine 
tuning other models to increase defense against adversarial 
attacks. 
Keywords— adversarial attacks, neural network, 
Binarization, Recall 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Today, many real world applications like Automated 
Driving[1], Anomaly Detection[2] and applications in 
Healthcare[3], are being realized using Deep Learning 
algorithms. This is all the more reason to focus on security 
when using these algorithms. Szegedy et al. first showed 
that it is possible to generate inputs, which a human is able 
to classify correctly but which completely mislead state-of-
the-art models, by only adding very small perturbations to 
the original image [4]. With Deep Learning algorithms 
being increasingly used in real world applications, a good 
defense mechanism against such adversarial attacks is 
strongly needed. There have been various attempts to 
increase robustness as well   as to classify inputs as being 
normal or adversarial([5] [6] [7] [8] [9] ).  However,  new 
attacks are developed everyday which can fool the 
existing state-of-the-art defense mechanisms. Also, most of 
the works focus mainly on gradient based attacks but not 
many have verified their results for non gradient based 
attacks. 
The prevalent defense techniques include changing the 
model architecture, including dropout or non-gradient 
based layers([5] [10]), or including adversarial examples at 
training time [11]. However, not much work has been done 
in exploring the effects that data manipulations have on 
adversarial defense. This paper explores the effects of 
binarizing the input image(modifying the input layer), as 
well as carrying out the task of image classification 
through image recall(modifying the output layer). We 
empirically observe the resistance of these changes against 
non gradient based attacks as implemented in Foolbox 
0.10.0 [12] and showed that these changes are indeed 
crucial for improving the robustness for specific image 
classification tasks. 
II. RELATED WORK 
A.  Types of adverserial attacks 
There are various kinds of adversarial attacks and new 
attacks keep getting prepared, but on a higher level, 
attacks can be classified into 4 groups: 
• Gradient Based Attacks: 
These are the most prevalent attacks. They rely on 
detailed model information like the gradient of the loss 
with respect to the input. Examples include FGSM[13], 
C&W Attack[14] , BIM[15] and DeepFool[16]. A 
common defense mechanism used against gradient based 
attacks is masking the gradients.This blocks the 
information which is necessary for such attacks. 
Examples of defense mechanisms against these attacks 
include defensive distillation [5]and saturated non-
linearities[17] 
• Score Based Attacks: 
These attacks, on a higher level, compute approximate 
gradients from the logits of the model. These include 
SinglePixelAttack[18] and blackbox variants of Gradient- 
Based attacks like C&W attack.[19]. However, numerical 
estimation of gradients from logits can be obstructed by 
introducing dropout layers in the network architecture. 
Defense mechanisms which hide the gradients as well as 
the numerical estimates were developed by Tramer et al. 
in 2017.[11] 
• Transfer Based Attacks: 
These attacks require information about the training data. 
They use the data to generate adversarial examples on an 
ensemble of models and rely on the fact that these 
examples will also be transferred to the original model, 
which means these will serve as adversarial examples for 
the original model as well. Works by Papernot et al.[20] 
and Liu et al[21] explore these attacks. 
 
• Decision Based Attacks: 
This is a recent class of attacks which require no 
information about the training data or gradients. They 
only depend upon the decision of the model for a given 
input. Examples include Boundary Attack[22](which 
Nf 
succeeded in misleading many state of the art models), 
Additive Gaussian Noise Attack and Additive Uniform 
Noise Attack.[12] 
Since these attacks require almost negligible 
information, they take longer to find an appropriate 
adversary for a given image. Though these attacks are 
computationally expensive, they could be the most 
relevant with respect to real world applications, where 
model information is generally not available. 
Our work focuses mainly upon Single Pixel 
Attacks(Figure 4), Boundary Attacks(Figure 6) and 
Additive Gaussian Noise Attacks(Figure 5 and 7) 
 
B. Different Defense and Classification Mechanisms 
Many attempts have been made to classify adversarial 
inputs from normal inputs as well as generating a strong 
robustness towards such attacks. Some of these include 
the following: 
• Local Intrinsic Dimensionality(LID) 
This method was developed in 2018 by Ma et al.[9] to 
classify normal and noisy inputs from adversarial ones. 
They argued that an adversarial example should have a 
higher dimensionality than a normal or noisy example. 
They calculated the local variant of the dimensionality 
from maximum likelihood estimate using k nearest 
neighbours of the particular example in the input dataset. 
Then they argued that the LID for an adversarial input is 
higher than a normal or noisy input, and based on the LID 
from each layer of the network, the inputs can be 
classified with a very high accuracy using Machine 
Learning Classifiers. 
• Ensemble Adversarial Training 
This method involves training on a dataset which 
includes adversarial examples from an ensemble of 
substitute models, along with the original dataset. It was 
developed in 2017 by Tramer et al.[11]This method has 
proven to be highly successful against almost all gradient 
based, score based as well as transfer based attacks in the 
2017 Kaggle Competition on Adversarial Attacks 1 
• Color Bit Reduction and Total Variance 
Minimization 
This method uses  a  similar  approach  as  ours  in  that 
it focuses on image preprocessing for adversarial 
defense. The color bit reduction decreases the  intensity  
according to the following formula: X[i,j] = X[i,j] - 
(X[i,j] % power(2,color bit), where color bit is a 
hyperparameter. [23] Total variance Minimization(TVM) 
makes use of denoising the image so as to reduce the 
variance between the pixels. We use the implementation 
of TVM as provided by skimage module of python for 
experiments[24]. Both these approaches aim to reduce 
the unnecessary features in images which are used by 
attacks. 
 
 
III PRELIMINARIES 
A. Classification versus Recall 
In general classification tasks, the network structure 
includes a few convolutional layers followed by dense 
layers, with the last layer(output layer) having nodes 
equal to the number of labels. However, in a recall task, 
the network tries to convert the input image into another 
image which is one of the representative images of each 
class. Thus, the number of output nodes is equal to the 
input size. The weights in the network are trained so that 
the input image is recalled into an image which has the 
least L2 distance from its corresponding representative 
image. An example is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Classification versus Recall 
B. Notation 
In this paper, we have used the implementations of 
different adversarial attacks as used in Foolbox[12]. We 
have taken the first image of each class as the 
representative image for the class. 
We define failed attacks as the inputs for which the 
attacking algorithm failed to find an attack or if found, is 
still classified correctly by the model. The second 
condition is important in case of certain restrictions on 
the input data like binarization. 
We define Resistance as the ratio of failed attacks to 
the number of total inputs. 
The following notation is used throughout the paper: 
• Nf : Number of failed attacks on a dataset 
• N : Size of the dataset 
• Ω : Resistance = N 
IV EXPERIMENTS - EFFECTS OF INPUT AND  OUTPUT 
LAYER MODIFICATIONS 
A. Types of Models 
We have used three types of models. All of them 
comprise of only fully connected layers with changes 
made only in the input and/or output layers. These are 
described as below: 
• IBOL ( Inputs Binarized Outputs Logits) - The inputs are 
binarized before passing to the model. The output nodes 
are equal to the number of labels. Hence, the output is a 
 vector with size equal to the number of classes. These 
denote the scores or probabilities of the input belonging 
to a class and are known as logits. 
• INOI ( Inputs Non-Binarized Outputs Images ) - the 
output nodes are equal to input size. Some examples are 
shown in figures 2 and 3. 
•  IBOI ( Inputs Binarized Outputs Images ) - the inputs are 
binarized and the outputs nodes are equal to input size. 
Some examples are shown in figures 2 and 3. 
For INOI and IBOI, we have carried out the classification 
task by taking the L2 distance between the recalled image 
and each of the representative images and choosing the 
label of the representative with the lowest L2 distance. L2 
distance is defined as the root of the sum of squares of the 
difference of pixels in the original and recalled images. In 
all the models, a standard 2 hidden layer neural network, 
with RELU activation function is used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Digit ’5’ recalled to its representative image in 
case of INOI(top two) and IBOI(bottom two) 
 
Figure 3: Digit ’3’ recalled to its representative image in 
case of INOI(top two) and IBOI(bottom two) 
 
B. Calculation of Resistance 
Since it was computationally very expensive to compute 
resistance using each of the 60,000 images of the MNIST 
dataset, we randomly selected 500 images to act as 
representative of the training data in case of boundary 
attacks. The algorithm we followed is described as 
Algorithm 1: 
 
 
 
 
Algorithm 1 Calculate Ω = Resistance                         
Require: model.predict(img) = labels(img) ∀ img ∈  
imgs  
imgs ← randomly select 500 images from dataset 
Nf ← 0 
N ← 500 
for all img ∈  imgs do 
    adv_image ← an adversarial attack using foolbox 
 
    try: dummy ← adv_img.shape {since foolbox returns 
none if it dosen’t find adversary} 
    with: adv_img ← img 
 
    if model.predict (adv_img) = model.predict (img) 
{attack failed} then 
        Nf  = Nf + 1 
    end if 
end for 
Ω← (Nf /N ) 
return Ω 
   
 
Figure 4: Example of a Single Pixel Attack on IBOL. (Left) 
original(5) (Center) adversary(misclassified as 3) (Right) 
Difference 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Example of a Additive Gaussian Attack on IBOI. 
(Left) original(0) (Center) adversary(2) (Right) Difference 
 
 
Figure 6: Example of a Boundary Attack on INOI. (Left) 
original(0) (Center) adversary(misclassified as 2) (Right) 
Difference 
V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The results are tabulated in table 1. Boundary attacks are 
costlier in terms of time taken per image and so we selected 
 
Figure 7: Example of Additive Gaussian Noise Attack on 
INOI. (Left) original(0) (Center) adversary(3) (Right) 
Difference 
 
Table 1: Attack Resistance for Different Models 
 SPA BA AGNA AUNA 
CDR 0.1 0.04 0.01 0.02 
TVM 0.15 0.05 0.02 0.02 
IBOL 0.98 0.933 0.606 0.994 
INOI 0.72 0.93 0.886 0.912 
IBOI 0.966 1.0 0.38 0.994 
SPA = Single Pixel Attack, BA = Boundary Attack, 
AGNA = Additive Gaussian Noise Attack, AUNA = 
Additive Uniform Noise Attack 
 
500 random samples across multiple runs for calculating 
resistance. It was observed that there was a difference of 
less than 0.05 in the measured resistance across multiple 
measurements. Hence, we can say that the values of 
resistance as given in the table are quite similar to what 
we would have observed if the same was done for all 
images. 
It can be seen clearly that IBOL and IBOI performs 
exceptionally well in all cases except for the Additive 
Gaussian Noise Attack. However, we don’t worry about 
the particular case since the resulting adversary, as seen 
in figure 5, is quite noisy to the human eye as well. This 
occurs because when we binarize the image, the ’noise’ 
reduces to either 1 or 0, which is easily distinguishable 
for the human eye as well. In the case of INOI where the 
range was 0 to 255, the noise amounts to very small 
changes in these values, which are not immediately 
perceivable for the human eye as well. We further tried 
other input varying layers such as Total Variance 
Minimization(TVM) and ColorDepth 
Reduction(CDR)[23] However, these techniques exhibit 
very poor resistance to almost all tested non gradient 
based attacks. 
For the three different models, we can make the 
following observations: 
1) When inputs are binarized, it highly increases 
resistance against decision based attacks. However, 
gradient based attacks are not fully eliminated since the 
model still has a continuous gradient. Also, binarizing an 
image reduces the required computational resources by a 
considerable amount. 
2) IBOI combines properties of both (1) and (2). Hence, 
it exhibits high robustness against all attacks. However, 
due to the opposing effects of reduction in complexity by 
binarization and increasing the complexity through recall, 
this model fails to scale to larger datasets easily. 
3) Boundary attack[22] has by far been the most 
successful. It has utmost importance in the real-world 
scenario, because it requires the minimum information 
about the model. It has deceived the previous state-of-the-
art defense mechanisms like Distillation[5] with a 
successful attack rate of almost 100 %. As far as we 
know, very few papers have tested for boundary attacks. 
However, the IBOI type of model exhibits quite high 
resistance to it, though we have only verified it for the 
MNIST dataset. 
4.) There is an unexpected drop in resistance in the 
case of TVM and CDR. This may be due to the fact that 
these techniques, as their names suggest, focus on 
decreasing the available feature space which can be 
exploited by gradient based attacks. The attacks 
analysed in this paper,mainly Gaussian and Uniform 
Noise Attacks, use a different technique(adding noise to 
the image) to fool models. Hence, decreasing the 
dimensionality of the feature space does not seem to 
have a desired effect on resistance 
VI. WHY DOES THIS WORK? 
We review why such results are obtained and why 
changing the input and output styles cause increase 
robustness. 
Binarization - The input image has pixels with values 
ranging from 0 to 255. We binarize it with 128 as the 
threshold. Thus, every pixel can now take a value of 
either 0 or 1. This drastically reduces the opportunities 
for ’slight’ perturbations since only the pixels with values 
close to 128 will be affected. Hence, even after an 
adversarial attack, the image is still classified as the 
original, or it is too noisy, even for the human eye, similar 
to figure 5. 
Recall - A proper representative image and appropriate 
training will recall an image as shown in figure 2 and 3. 
Even with slight perturbations to the image, the new 
recalled output formed will be farther away from the 
representative image. However, due to the increased 
number of attributes(depending on the size of the image), 
the recalled image should still be closer to the 
representative image of the same class than from those of 
other classes. In other words, the changes in the value of a 
single pixel are not much important in recall. Since the 
recalled output for an input image also looks alike to the 
human eye, it follows that attacks like Boundary attack, 
which iterate to bring the adversarial sample closer to the 
original image, don’t work that well. This  is unlike the 
case when the output is a single label from the 
culmination of all the pixels of the input image. Thus, by 
increasing the complexity of the output space, we try to 
increase robustness against Decision based attacks 
VII.  DRAWBACKS 
1.) Non transferability to diverse datasets - The 
method proposed above cannot be directly scaled to 
datasets like CIFAR where the images belonging to the 
same class are highly different from each other. This 
proves to be a problem in recalling to a particular image 
of a class. How this can be done is a topic for future work. 
Also, recalling an image is much more complex than the 
traditional classification. Hence, for classifying large and 
diverse datasets, major changes must be made in the 
architecture and training process. We verified this by 
running the recall model on CIFAR 10 and using ResNet 
but we could not get even 20 % accuracy. 
2.) Choosing the representative image - The 
representative image is currently the first image as 
provided by the dataset. However, there should be a better 
way of choosing a representative image. It cannot simply 
be the image with the least error since the learning 
process commences after the representative selection. 
3.) Binarization Technique - For binarization, we 
applied a simple threshold at intensity value 127. However, 
this can be replaced by techniques like BRINT[25] and 
Binarization Ensembles[26], which have been shown to be 
more robust to rotation and scaling, while successfully 
compressing the data. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
We conclude that along with the model architecture, the 
descriptions of the input and output layers also play a major 
role in deciding the robustness of the model. Also, we have 
shown that this method is quite resistant against the 
recently developed, effective and the least tested decision 
attacks like the boundary attack. We observed that recalling 
an image is much more complicated than outputting logits 
but is highly resistant to adversarial attacks. Such attacks 
target the high dimensionality of the input, and so there 
arises a tradeoff between accuracy and robustness due to 
compression of the image. We think that finding and 
improving techniques to involve compression without 
harming the overall classification accuracy is an interesting 
problem. 
We believe that this architecture can replace the dense 
layers at the head of existing state-of-the-art models and 
can increase robustness. The proposed method, as of now 
has drawbacks for image recognition. However, when 
images of a class are highly similar to each other as in 
MNIST dataset, we expect that fine tuning with IBOI 
should greatly render robustness to the overall model. This 
can find potential applications in the robust Non 
Destructive Evaluation of machine parts in industry. 
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